A Sanctuary for Those Who Serve: United States Iraqi Special Immigrant Visa Programs by Twu, Marianne
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 35 | Number 3 Article 5
Spring 2010
A Sanctuary for Those Who Serve: United States
Iraqi Special Immigrant Visa Programs
Marianne Twu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Marianne Twu, A Sanctuary for Those Who Serve: United States Iraqi Special Immigrant Visa Programs, 35 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg.
723 (2009).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol35/iss3/5
A Sanctuary for Those Who Serve: United States Iraqi Special Immigrant
Visa Programs
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This comments is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation:
http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol35/iss3/5
A Sanctuary for Those Who Serve:
United States Iraqi Special Immigrant
Visa Programs f
1. Introduction ....................................................................... 724
II. State of Iraqi Refugees ...................................................... 726
A. Population of Iraqi Refugees ....................................... 726
B. Conditions of Iraqi Refugees ...................................... 728
C. Status of Iraqi Interpreters/Translators ....................... 729
III. Iraqi Immigrant Programs in Host Countries .................... 730
A . B ritain .......................................................................... 732
B . A ustralia ...................................................................... 735
C . D enm ark ...................................................................... 735
IV. Special Immigrant Visa Programs in the United States .... 736
A. Section 1059 Program for Iraqi
Interpreters/Translators ............................................... 737
B. Section 1244 Special Immigration Visa Program
for U.S.-Employed Iraqis ............................................ 743
C. Refugee Benefits under Special Immigration Visa
Program s ..................................................................... 747
V. Ongoing Obstacles with Special Immigration Visa
Program s ............................................................................ 748
A . Lack of V isas .............................................................. 748
B. Inefficiency of Visa Processing .................................. 749
C. Invalidation of Iraqi Passports .................................... 750
VI. Recommendations for Action ............................................ 754
A. Clarify Definitions in Special Immigation Visa
Statutory Provisions .................................................... 754
B. Assess Resettlement Benefit Policies ......................... 755
C. Expedite the Issuing of Iraqi G-Series Passports ........ 757
D. Continue Providing Bilateral Assistance to Major
H ost C ountries ............................................................. 758
V II. C onclusion ......................................................................... 758
"I don't know if it's fair to say, 'You work at an embassy of a
foreign country, so that country has to evacuate you,"' he said.
"Do the Australians have a plan? Do the Romanians? The
Turks? The British?" He added, "If I worked at the Hungarian
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Embassy in Washington, would the Hungarians evacuate me
from the United States?"
When I mentioned these remarks to Othman, he asked,
"Would the Americans behead an American working at the
Hungarian Embassy in Washington?"'
I. Introduction
The breakout of the Second Gulf War in 2003 incited violence,
suffering, and the uprooting of millions of Iraqi nationals.2 More
than four million Iraqis fled their homes to other areas of the
country as well as neighboring countries.3 Among these displaced
persons were those who worked for U.S. or other foreign military
forces providing valuable Arabic interpretation and translation
services.4  Their language skills had been utilized at Iraqi
checkpoints, training centers, and administrative offices, as well as
on the battlegrounds; these workers were consequently considered
valuable and crucial assets to their U.S. employers.5 For these
individuals, the decision to work using their language skills comes
at a cost, as they are viewed by their own countrymen as traitors
f"This Comment was awarded the William T. Joyner Award for Excellence in Journal
Writing as the best student piece of 2009-2010.
I George Packer, Betrayed: The Iraqis Who Trusted America the Most, NEW
YORKER, Mar. 26, 2007, at 52 (commenting on the shattered hope that the U.S.
government would provide a way out of Iraq for those Iraqi citizens who had risked their
lives to work for American forces). Othman, an Iraqi who worked as a translator in
Baghdad, had hoped that the U.S. would help him flee Iraq when it became too
dangerous for him to remain. At the time of his interview, he was still in Baghdad, living
in secrecy and fear of being discovered. Id.
2 See INT'L RESCUE COMM., FIVE YEARS LATER, A HIDDEN CRISIS: REPORT OF THE
IRC COMMISSION ON IRAQI REFUGEES, at i (2008), available at
http://www.ircuk.org/fileadmin/user upload/Reports/iraqreport.pdf (The report is based
on the International Rescue Committee's Commission on Iraqi Refugees' February 2008
visit to the Middle East. It draws from meetings with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad;
senior officials from the governments of Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and the United States; U.N.
representatives; and refugees in Jordan and Syria.). Id.
3 See id.
4 See Paul Thompson, Current Development, Development in International Area:
Iraqi Translators Face Difficulties Gaining Asylum in the United States, 22 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 141, 141, 144 (2007).
5 See id.
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and face persecution, even after ending their employment.6 As a
result, Iraqi interpreters and translators, along with their families,
must either suffer a dangerous existence in Iraq or flee to
surrounding countries, where the threat of persecution may still
remain even after they leave.7 Thus, the only true relief for these
Iraqis is permanent resettlement outside of Iraq and its
neighboring countries.' The plight of Iraqi interpreters and
translators, while only one aspect of the greater Iraqi refugee
situation, is significant because it raises the question of whether
countries with a military presence in Iraq owe a special duty to
protect, and even aid in resettling those Iraqi nationals who risked
their lives to offer their services as interpreters and translators.
Various policies have been adopted by a number of nations,
including the United States, to address the unfortunate situation of
Iraqi interpreters still living in Iraq under threat of persecution.
The United States first responded by enacting Section 1059 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, which
provides a special immigration visa for Afghan and Iraqi
interpreters and translators who worked for the U.S. armed forces
in Iraq.9 The more recently enacted Section 1244 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 expands the class
of beneficiaries to include Iraqi nationals who were employed in
any capacity by the U.S. government in Iraq.' ° Together, these
two initiatives mark a significant step in U.S. responsiveness to the
Iraqi refugee crisis." Nevertheless, these and similar programs
implemented in other countries still face significant obstacles.
12
Problems with policy specificity, efficiency, and resource
allotment threaten the true realization of the goals of these
programs.
Before delving into the laws and policies concerning the
6 See id. at 141-42.
7 See id. at 141, 144.
8 See id. at 142-43.
9 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
163, § 1059, 119 Stat. 3136, 3443-44.
10 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
181, § 1244, 122 Stat. 3, 396-98.
11 See infra Part. IV.A-C.
12 See infra Part V.A-C.
2010]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
resettlement of Iraqi interpreters and translators, it is essential to
broadly understand the state of the Iraqi refugee crisis. This
comment will examine the geographical distribution of the Iraqi
refugee population, as well as the characteristics of Iraqi refugees
that set them apart from other groups of refugees. After assessing
the issues Iraqi refugees generally face, this Comment will explore
the unique issues with which Iraqi interpreters and translators who
have worked for the U.S. and other foreign armed forces must
deal. For these translators and interpreters, permanent
resettlement is often the only option. Some employer countries
have implemented immigration and resettlement programs for
formerly employed Iraqi nationals. Programs in Britain, Australia,
and Denmark serve as case studies of different approaches to
addressing the needs of previously employed Iraqis who are
seeking resettlement. This Comment will also analyze the existing
U.S. special immigration program for Iraqi interpreters and
translators, as well as the newer Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
program that was enacted in 2008 through Section 1244 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.13 The
information gleaned from these assessments can be used to
formulate several recommendations for successful implementation
of the Section 1244 SIV program, as well as more general
recommendations to facilitate the processing of Iraqi immigration
applications.
II. State of Iraqi Refugees
A. Population of Iraqi Refugees
As a result of the ongoing conflict in Iraq and the subsequent
breakdown in rule of law since March 2003, many citizens of Iraq
have either fled their homes to escape to neighboring countries or
remained in Iraq as internally displaced persons.14 Recent reports
by the International Rescue Committee estimate that there are
approximately four million displaced Iraqis, with one to two
million of those currently living in the countries neighboring
Iraq.'5  Among these host countries, Jordan and Syria are
13 Id.
14 See INT'L RESCUE COMM., supra note 2, at i, 2.
15 Id.
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shouldering most of the burden of the Iraqi refugee situation. 6
According to a February 2008 study conducted by the United
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), out of the
estimated two million displaced Iraqis in the neighboring region,
as many as 1.5 million are living in Syria and close to 500,000 are
living in Jordan, making displaced Iraqis six and eight percent of
the countries' total populations, respectively. 7 The remaining
displaced Iraqis live primarily in Lebanon, Egypt, and Turkey.1
8
While Iraqi refugees experience some of the same conditions
and needs as other refugee groups, there are also distinct
characteristics that set apart the Iraqi refugee situation.' 9 Other
refugee groups often live in camps, and are therefore easily
identified and located.2" Iraqi refugees, on the other hand, are
scattered among homes across cities; hidden not only to the eyes
of the world, but even to those living in the neighborhood.21
Perhaps exacerbated by the difficulty of locating them, host
countries, international governments, and relief organizations
often do not provide aid to Iraqi refugees.22 Contrast this with
camp-based refugee groups who receive basic services from
international sources and can benefit from aid groups that mobilize
support and resources.23 The lack of a camp base also creates
problems with data gathering.24 It is difficult to compile an
accurate estimate of the number of Iraqi refugees because they are
scattered and hidden.25 Even if there were a mobilized effort to
compile this information, it would be nearly impossible for
authorities to contact the refugees that they do locate.26 Without
the camp-based system that is characteristic of many other refugee
groups, authorities can neither gather the data necessary to inform
16 Id. at 6.
17 Id. at 2. The population of Syria is 19.315 million and Jordan is 6.053 million
for these calculations. Id.
18 Id.
19 See id. at 5.
20 See INT'L RESCUE COMM., supra note 2, at 5.
21 See id.
22 See id.
23 See id.
24 Id.
25 See id.
26 See INT'L RESCUE COMM., supra note 2, at 5.
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refugees about their available benefits, rights, and resettlement
options nor provide accurate data to the international aid
community."
B. Conditions of Iraqi Refugees
This growing population of refugees faces pressing problems,
including trauma from continued exposure to warfare and
violence; unavailability of basic health care; fear of enrolling their
children in schools; laws against Iraqis working in neighboring
countries; minimal financial resources; and lack of legal status.28
Unquestionably, large populations of Iraqi refugees place
increasing strains on host countries, especially Syria and Jordan.29
Both the Syrian and Jordanian governments have estimated that
the total annual cost of accommodating Iraqi refugees within their
borders is $1 billion.3" In February 2008, the Jordanian Minister
of Planning and International Cooperation increased this estimate
to $2.2 billion, including the cost for Iraqi education and
healthcare.3" At that time, Jordan's education system was
accommodating 24,000 Iraqi students, which forced schools to
adopt a double-shift schedule in order to address the
overcrowding.3 2 Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has expressed
concern over the need to build new schools and clinics because of
the influx of Iraqi refugees, and has also stated that the
international community, especially the United States, is not doing
enough to relieve Syria's burden of hosting refugees.33
Another burden host countries incur is the decision of whether
to grant legal status to this influx of Iraqis.34 Unlike camp-based
refugees who are given legal status, Iraqi refugees living in host
countries such as Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon have an
27 See id.
28 Id. at 3-4.
29 Id. at 6.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Jordan: Schools Creaking Under Burden of 24,000 Iraqi Students, 1 1, IRIN
NEWS, Feb. 13, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?Reportld=76717.
33 See INT'L RESCUE COMM., supra note 2, at 7.
34 See id. at 4.
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uncertain legal status.35 These countries do not formally recognize
the refugee status of the Iraqis living within their borders; thus,
although UNHCR issues identity papers for some Iraqis living in
Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, these documents do not necessarily
protect them from being arrested and deported.36
C. Status of Iraqi Interpreters/Translators
Since the Second Gulf War, Iraqi interpreters and translators
have played an essential role in the U.S. military and
reconstruction campaigns in Iraq.37 Such dependence on their
services, however, has made them a target of Iraqi militia, who see
them as "enemy" forces.38 Accused of being traitors to their
country, Iraqi interpreters and translators suffer from "death
threats, intimidation campaigns, kidnappings, and murder, not
only at the hands of insurgents, but also from neighbors,
classmates, and friends."3 9 Even after their services have ended,
translators and interpreters, along with their families, continue to
face violence, threats, and persecution.4 ° In 2005, approximately
forty percent of the deaths reported by private contractors to the
U.S. Labor Department were Iraqi translators.4 Presented with
such violence and danger in their home country, the only available
option for many Iraqi interpreters and translators is permanent
resettlement.4 2  The plight of Iraqi interpreters and translators
employed by foreign armed forces is only one aspect of the larger
Iraqi refugee crisis. The extreme violence toward these workers
triggers moral concerns and suggests that their employers should
be required to fulfill special obligations to protect their safety.43
Ryan Crocker, the American ambassador to Iraq, stated the need
for the United States to "reward Iraqis working for the United
35 See id.
36 Id.
37 See Thompson, supra note 4, at 141.
38 See id.
39 Id. at 141-42.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 142.
42 See id.
43 See Thompson, supra note 4, at 143-44.
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States for their sacrifice, loyalty and dedication .
Similarly, the late Senator Edward Kennedy recognized a "special
obligation to keep faith with the Iraqis who have bravely worked
for us, and often paid a terrible price for it by providing them with
safe refuge in the United States. '
III.Iraqi Immigrant Programs in Host Countries
Between October, 2005, and September, 2006, the United
States admitted two hundred and two Iraqis as refugees,
most of them from the years under Saddam. Last year, the
Bush Administration increased the allotment to five
hundred. By the end of 2006, there were almost two
million Iraqis living as refugees outside their country -
most of them in Syria and Jordan. American policy held
that these Iraqis were not refugees, that they would go back
to their country as soon as it was stabilized. The U.S.
Embassies in Damascus and Amman continued to turn
down almost all visa applications from Iraqis. So the
fastest-growing refugee crisis in the world remained
hidden, receiving little attention other than in a few reports
from organizations like Human Rights Watch and
Refugees International.46
International actors need to come together to address the
growing Iraqi refugee crisis. While the UNHCR is providing
direct aid (health care to refugee families and educational
opportunities for Iraqi children) these efforts reach only a small
portion of those Iraqi refugees in Syria, Jordan, and neighboring
countries.47 Other countries, specifically the United States and
European countries, must step in and utilize their resources to
44 Id. (citing Cable from Ryan C. Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, to Condoleeza
Rice, Sec'y of State, Iraqi Refugee Processing: Can We Speed It Up? (Sept. 7, 2007),
available at http://www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/Crocker/20Cable%202,%209-07.pdf).
45 The Plight of Iraqi Refugees: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 4 (2007) (statement of Hon. Edward M. Kennedy), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1 10_senatehearings&docid=f:33563.pdf; see also id. at 144.
46 See Packer, supra note 1, at 69-70.
47 See INT'L RESCUE COMM., supra note 2, at 7. In 2007, UNHCR provided health
care to 210,000 families. Id. Through a partnership with the World Food Program,
UNHCR made a goal to provide food aid for up to 360,000 families by the end of 2008.
Id.
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respond to the needs of these Iraqi refugees.
One way in which the international community is playing a
role in remedying the Iraqi refugee crisis is through the
resettlement of Iraqi refugees, especially those Iraqis who were
employed by their foreign armed forces. Countries that enlisted
the services of Iraqis have taken various commendable steps to
provide these individuals and their families aid and protection
within their own borders as a form of gratitude for their faithful
service.48  Jordan and Syria, two countries immediately
neighboring Iraq, are also the most common sanctuaries for Iraqis
fleeing from persecution and dangerous threats.4 9  For these
countries, acceptance of Iraqi refugees is more of a response to an
inevitable reality than an assumption of a moral duty, as is the case
in other host countries. Generally, European countries "are
indifferent toward the Iraqi refugee crisis, indicating that those
who invaded Iraq (the United States and the United Kingdom) are
largely responsible and thus must address the consequences."5 A
February 2008 survey conducted by the European Council on
Refugees and Exiles revealed that "Europe's response to the crisis
of displaced Iraqis has been hugely inadequate with European
governments failing to fairly share the responsibility for Iraqi
refugees with one another and with other countries around the
world."'" Nevertheless, special immigration and resettlement
programs, albeit with stringent eligibility requirements and
policies, do exist in EU countries and elsewhere.5 2
Immigration and resettlement programs face numerous
challenges ranging from determining fair eligibility requirements
and policies to generating the necessary funding to dealing with
public sentiment. 3 Comparing existing programs in various host
countries across Europe and Australia sheds light on common
48 See id. ("The Kennedy legislation expands the categories of Iraqis who will have
priority for admission to the United States as refugees.").
49 See id. at 2.
50 Id. at 11.
51 EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES, FIVE YEARS ON EUROPE Is STILL
IGNORING ITS RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARDS IRAQI REFUGEES 1 (2008),
http://www.ecre.org/files/ECRE SurveyIraq_2008.pdf (follow "ECRE 2008 Iraq
Survey" hyperlink) [hereinafter ECRE REPORT].
52 See id. at 2.
53 See infra Part III.A-C.
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issues that plague these kinds of immigration programs. For the
United States, the successes as well as problems of Iraqi programs
globally offer guidance for improving existing and creating new
U.S. special immigration programs that target those who served
U.S. forces in Iraq. This section discusses the treatment of Iraqi
interpreters in three countries: Britain, Australia, and Denmark.
These three countries were selected because they highlight
potential problems that may befall similar programs in the United
States. Looking at the causes of such problems is an attempt to
prevent the same from happening in similar U.S. programs.
A. Britain
The current settlement scheme set up by the Ministry of
Defense, known as the Gateway scheme, is intended to help
resettle Iraqi interpreters who have provided service to the British
forces in Iraq. 4 Despite its initial promise, the program did not
resettle many immigrants. In fact, it had rejected 200 out of 600
Iraqi interpreter applicants by December 2007."5 Though the
program holds itself out as a resettlement program, it offers
applicants either a chance to apply for asylum in Britain or a one-
time financial payment.16 The program set a quota of 500 Iraqis,
but that cap included any dependants applying under the
petitioner.57 The scheme also contains a twelve-month continuous
employment requirement, which creates a difficult burden of proof
for the petitioner.58 In 2007, it was estimated that those applicants
who were fortunate enough to qualify may not have been able to
enter Britain until the summer of 2009.59
A recent case brought by two former Iraqi interpreters for the
British forces reveals the tension between these immigrants
seeking protection and the British government's struggle to create
strictly tailored resettlement programs. A group of Iraqi
54 See Deborah Haynes & Michael Evans, Iraqi Interpreters Seeking Asylum in
Britain Will Be Refused Entry Until 2009, TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 13, 2007,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article3042949.ece.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 See id.
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interpreters, staff, and laborers who endured persecution while
working for British forces challenged the government's refusal to
grant them sanctuary within its borders.6 ° The group of plaintiffs
had hoped that the U.K. government's resettlement and
compensation scheme would help them to establish new lives in
Britain; instead, they encountered "harsh rules which have
betrayed Iraqis" who had faithfully served Britain.6 The law firm
Leigh Day & Co. represented the two former Iraqi interpreters and
a laundry assistant who had worked for a British contractor,
arguing before the High Court that because the resettlement
scheme's intent was to protect Iraqis who had worked for the
British government, the rigid criteria violated a duty of care.62
Richard Stein, human rights partner at solicitors Leigh Day & Co.,
representing the Iraqis stated:
[t]his is a classic example of the Government seeking to
put to bed a political problem without any due
consideration for the human story which caused the
problem. The Scheme is arbitrary, disingenuous and
patently unfair. It should be quashed and replaced with a
scheme which takes true account of the debt owed to these
men and their families.
63
More specific claims were that the twelve-month minimum
service requirement, the work restrictions to specified
organizations, and the "application of the Scheme only to
employment after 1 January 2005 [were] irrational, unfair, and
disproportionate."'
Lawyers for the Ministry of Defense argued that the
60 Robert Verkaik, 'Betrayed' Iraqi Staff in Test Case over UK's Refusal to Offer
Asylum, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 14, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
uk/home-news/betrayed-iraqi-staff-in-test-case-over-uks-refusal-to-offer-asylum-
808629.html.
61 Id.
62 See Deborah Haynes, No Softening of Asylum Rules for the Iraqis Who Risked
Their Lives, TIMES ONLINE, Sept. 11, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
news/politics/article4727580.ece.
63 Leigh Day & Co., Former UK Employees in Iraq Take Government to Court for
Refusing to Assist Them 4 (Sept. 9, 2008), http://www.leighday.co.uk/news/news-
archive/former-uk-employees-in-iraq-take-government-to.
64 Leigh Day & Co., Skeleton Legal Argument AA Etc. v. FCO and MoD,
http://www.leighday.co.uk (search for "Skeleton legal argument") (last visited Apr. 1,
2010).
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limitations and rigid criteria were necessary to prevent the scheme
from becoming too burdensome or costly, a necessary concern
because the government had employed more than 20,000 Iraqis
since 2003.65 In a decision handed down on September 10, 2008,
the Judge ruled in favor of the Government, supporting the denial
of asylum to the Iraqi interpreters.66 Leigh Day & Co. plans to
investigate any further options for the Iraqis, however, stating that
the decision had "killed this legal challenge dead."67  In the
aftermath, the Ministry of Defense remained confident that the
program, which offers Iraqi employees a choice between a chance
of resettlement or a financial package, has appropriate eligibility
requirements. 6' The British Government has expressed its
intention to review the scheme again, but is not promising any
changes to the program's guidelines.69
By September 2008, the British Government had given homes
to approximately seventy-three Iraqis.7" Nevertheless, the location
and condition of these government-provided homes raised
additional concerns. The first group of Iraqis who were granted
resettlement in Britain lived in high tower blocks in a Glasgow
neighborhood with high incidences of poverty and violence.7
Politicians and government leaders are rallying to protest the
treatment of these Iraqis, most of whom had risked their lives to
serve the British forces in Iraq.7 2 Sir Menzies Campbell, former
leader of the Liberal Democrats expressed:
[Britain's] moral obligation to these people extends beyond
putting them in poor housing with inadequate financial
support. They and their families risked their lives daily to
help to further the interests of Britain in Iraq ... I have no
doubt whatsoever that we owe these families much more
65 See Haynes, supra note 62.
66 See id.
67 Id. 11.
68 See id.
69 See id.
70 Id.
71 See Michael Evans & Sam Coates, Britain Shamed As Iraqi Interpreters Are
Resettled in Squalid Tower Blocks, TIMES ONLINE, June 13, 2008,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article4124673.ece.
72 See id.
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than we seem to be giving them.73
B. Australia
In April 2008, the Australian government announced that it
would accept an allotment of 100 Iraqis who had worked with
Australian troops as interpreters and support staff along with their
families, totaling approximately 400 individuals.74 Since their
arrival, the Iraqi immigrants have expressed dissatisfaction with
the government's resettlement efforts in housing, job hunting, and
financial support-essentially, the reality of resettlement in
Australia fell far short of their expectations.75 The Australian
government continues to assert that these Iraqi immigrants were
properly processed under the resettlement laws and received all of
the entitlements available under those laws.76 The Australian
Immigration Department expressed confidence that its
immigration officials in Iraq clearly communicate what is offered
to Iraqi immigrants under the Australian resettlement program and
do not falsely represent the benefits entitled to refugees.17 Some
Iraqis admitted that certain expectations regarding benefits and
services came from the Australian troops with whom they had
worked, but others state that they were "misled during interviews
in Iraq, with officials implying that rents would take only 20% of
their welfare payments until they could secure jobs."78 Despite
continued insistence that what was provided to the Iraqi
immigrants adheres to legal guidelines, many Iraqis are
considering returning to Iraq, according to one Iraqi interpreter, "if
the Government would pay the fares."79
C. Denmark
From 2006 to 2007, Denmark significantly increased its
73 Id. 9.
74 Simon Mann, Resettled Iraqis Left Feeling Dumped, THE AGE (Melbource,
Austl.), Aug. 5, 2008, 8, available at http://www.theage.com.au/national/resettled-
iraqis-left-feeling-dumped-20080804-3pyu.html?page=3.
75 See id.
76 See generally id. (discussing dissatisfaction within Iraqi refugee community
regarding resettlement).
77 See id.
78 Id. 18.
79 Id. 20.
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resettlement quota from just one Iraqi refugee acceptance to ten
Iraqis, along with the initiation of a new resettlement program for
Iraqi interpreters who had worked for the Danish armed forces in
Iraq.8" When this resettlement program was implemented in the
summer of 2007, the Danish government granted asylum to 100
Iraqi interpreters and family members, whose lives "were deemed
to be in danger in Iraq as a result of their work with the Danish
military."'" By January 2008, 367 out of 376 cases had been
processed and accepted, deeming the program a success.8 2 Since
then, however, at least eighty of the 370 total individuals who
arrived in Denmark have returned to Iraq. The first group returned
in August 2008 while a second group was already preparing to
return.83 The primary reason for the decision to return to Iraq was
an inability to find work in Denmark despite previous jobs as
engineers and doctors.84 These decisions were made after refugee
counseling (a service provided by the Danish government) and
serious consideration of returning to dangers that caused them to
flee the country in the first place.85 Under Denmark's repatriation
laws, Iraqi interpreters who return to Iraq are entitled to financial
support.86 The Danish government pays for their "personal
effects" up to DKK 27,400 per adult and DKK 8,770 per child, in
addition to a one-year sickness benefit coverage of DKK 5,500 per
person.87  For those who wish to start businesses back in their
home country, the government will also provide DKK 12,000.88
IV. Special Immigrant Visa Programs in the United States
Having conducted an analysis of current Iraqi immigration
policies in these three countries, relevant lessons and precautions
can be applied to U.S. policy. Currently, the United States
80 See ECRE REPORT, supra note 51, at 3.
81 Julian Isherwood, Iraqi Interpreters Going Home, POLITIKEN.DK, Sept.2, 2008,
4, http://politiken.dk/newsinenglish/article561479.ece.
82 See ECRE REPORT, supra note 51, at 3.
83 See Isherwood, supra note 81.
84 See id.
85 See id.
86 Id.
87 ld. 7.
88 Id. 8.
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provides two programs that make immigrant visas available to
Iraqi interpreters and translators who worked for the U.S. armed
forces.89 The first program was enacted under Section 1059 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 to target
Iraqi and Afghan nationals who worked as interpreters and
translators exclusively.9" Since its enactment, the program has
both met and fallen short of some of its legislative goals, thus
motivating the need for evaluation and policy improvements. 9' A
second program, created under Section 1244 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, is a very recent
program that has yet to fully develop administrative guidelines for
successful implementation. 92 Along with this ambitious and recent
Iraqi special immigrant program is a relatively new policy
providing resettlement benefits for Iraqi immigrants arriving under
these two immigrant programs. 93 With such policies on the
forefront of U.S. immigration policy, and with such potential to
impact great change, it is essential to understand the legislative
goals of such programs, to learn from similar programs in other
countries, and to learn from existing policies in the United States.
A. Section 1059 Program for Iraqi Interpreters/Translators
The Immigrant Nationality Act of 1996 established aspects of
the current U.S. immigration system of immigrant and non-
immigrant visas.94  The Act established two categories of
immigrant visas based upon either family relationships or
employment. 95 A third method of obtaining an immigrant visa is
through the diversity lottery where, after "identification of high-
admission and low-admission regions and high-admission and
low-admission states,"96  the visas are distributed to petitioners
from states and regions that had low admission rates in the
89 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
163, § 1059, 119 Stat. 3136, 3443-44; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1244, 122 Stat. 3, 396-98.
90 See National Defense Authorization Act § 1059.
91 See infra Part V.A.
92 See National Defense Authorization Act § 1244.
93 See infra Part IV.B.
94 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(2007).
95 See id.
96 Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(c)(1)(B).
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previous five fiscal years.97 An annual minimum, or "worldwide
level," of 140,000 employment-based visas are distributed across
five different preference categories."a  Employment Fourth
Preference (E4) comprises the SIV and makes up 7.1% of the
annual limit.99 Among the various classes of individuals that fall
under this special immigrant category are certain religious
workers, juvenile court dependents, and employees that have
served in specific capacities in various countries. 100 Congress can
establish new classes of people who are entitled to special
immigrant status under the E4 category depending upon
humanitarian or other interests of the United States.' 1 Congress,
through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006, authorized special immigration status for interpreters and
translators of Iraqi and Afghan nationality who served under the
U.S. Armed Forces and/or the Chief of Mission (COM). 10 2  By
creating this program under the Act, Congress was able to provide
a path for U.S.-employed Afghans and Iraqis to come into the
country without formally having to amend existing Immigrant
Nationality Act provisions.'0 3 Under this program, Iraqi and
Afghan nationals can self-petition for a SIV as long as they:
* Worked directly as interpreters or translators with the U.S.
Armed Forces or the COM for a period of at least twelve
97 Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(c)(1)(A).
98 Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 201(d), 203(b).
99 Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(b)(4) ("[For] Certain Special
immigrants-Visas shall be made available, in a number not to exceed 7.1 percent of
such worldwide level, to qualified special immigrants described in section 101(a)(27)
(other than those described in subparagraph (a) or (B) thereof), of which not more than
5,000 may be made available in any fiscal year to special immigrants described in
subclause (II) or (III) of section 101(a)(27)(C)(ii), 21 and not more than 100 may be
made available in any fiscal year to special immigrants, excluding spouses and children,
who are described in section 101 (a)(27)(M).").
100 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27) (providing special immigrant status for, among
others, broadcasters in the United States employed by the International Broadcasting
Bureaus, employees of the Chief of Mission in Hong Kong, certain former employees of
the Panama Canal Company or Canal Zone Government).
101 Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(b)(4).
102 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
163, § 1059, 119 Stat. 3136, 3443-44.
103 See MIDDLE E. REGIONAL OFF., U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, STATUS OF IRAQI SPECIAL
IMMIGRANT VISA PROGRAMS 3 (2008), available at http://oig.state.gov/documents/
organization/109298.pdf [hereinafter STATUS REPORT].
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months, or in case of death of an interpreter or translator,
are an immediate family member;
* Obtained favorable written recommendations from a general
or flag officer in the chain of command or from the COM;
" Clear a background check and screening as determined by a
general or flag officer in the chain of command or from the
COM; and
* Are otherwise eligible to receive an immigrant visa and
admission to the United States for permanent residence,
except that the grounds for inadmissibility relating to
'public charge' shall not apply."0
The 2006 Act originally limited the program to a distribution
of 50 SIVs annually to eligible petitioners."°5 Congress amended
this SIV program the next year, expanding the program to an
allotment of 500 SIVs available annually through fiscal years 2007
and 2008.1°6 In June 2008, President Bush amended the program
yet again, extending the process of SIV petitions that had already
been sent to the National Visa Center through September 30,
2008.107 As a result, any petition that was already received by the
National Visa Center prior to September 30 would still count
toward the expanded 500 visa limit.0 8 As of October 1, 2008, any
petitions seeking special immigrant status under this program are
subject to the original cap of 50.'09
Congress's intent in enacting this program was "to reward and
protect those men and women who put themselves and their
families at great personal risk by assisting the U.S. government in
Iraq and Afghanistan as interpreters and translators."110
Nevertheless, implementation problems arose, primarily as a result
of the cap increase in 2007."' In the first year of the program,
petitions quickly reached the cap of 50 and due to the smaller
104 Id.
105 See id.
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See id.
109 See id.
110 Id. at 10; see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-163, § 1059, 119 Stat. 3136, 3443-44.
111 See STATUS REPORT, supra note 103.
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caseload at the time, consular agents at U.S. embassies in the
region were able to scrutinize each petition carefully to ensure that
only those who truly met the requirements received visas."
12
When the cap was increased from 50 to 500, the caseload for each
officer more than doubled, presenting new challenges to meet
processing timelines." 3  In addition to the higher volume of
petitions, the officers were also under increased pressure to
expedite the adjudication process, which commonly resulted in
less thorough screening procedures." 4  A subsequent case file
analysis revealed that the average number of days needed to
process Iraqi SIV petitions was eight days for review by USCIS,
forty days at the National Visa Center, and twenty days at the
consular offices." 5 This procedure, lasting a combined total of
nine weeks, is significantly quicker than the four to six months
required for processing immigrant visa applications for immediate
relatives of U.S. citizens." 1
6
Case file review also revealed that a number of SIVs were
allocated to individuals who did not fall into the legislative scope
of the program. "7 The root of this problem lay in the lack of
specificity in the statutory language "interpreter and translator."
'
"
8
The review by the Office of Inspector General revealed that "a
significant number of approved applicant petitions-more than 25
percent-did not meet the program's criteria of working as an
interpreter or translator."'' 19 Specifically, examinations found that
out of 177 active files at the U.S. Embassy in Amman, 46 cases
involved petitioners who worked as medical doctors, engineers,
pharmacists, and caterers among other positions. 12  Some
petitioners did participate in some interpretation and translation
work, but only as a side duty to another line of work. 12' This is a
112 See id. at 7.
113 See id.
114 See id. at 10.
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 See STATUS REPORT, supra note 103, at 10.
118 See id.
119 Id. at 8.
120 See id.
121 See id.
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real cause for concern especially considering that the legislative
scope applies to only 500 individuals whose primary work is
translation and interpretation and, as of October 1, 2008, applied
to only 50.122 The program does require a "favorable written
recommendation from a general or flag officer in the chain of
command of the U.S. Armed Forces unit that was supported by the
alien,'"123 a requirement intended to ensure that only those who
actually worked as an interpreter and translator would benefit.
This recommendation requirement is essential to the petitioner's
application in that it establishes "faithful and valuable service" to
the United States. 124 Nevertheless, many of the recommendation
letters from these supervisors were so similar in language and
format, suggesting that they may have been "nonspecific pro
forma documents endorsing petition submissions from military
subordinates in the general or flag officer's chain of command."' 1
25
Nonspecific documents are worrisome for two main reasons: First,
the supervisors are not taking seriously their recommendation
duties, which in fact do have great weight in the petitioning
process; and second, Iraqi petitioners who may not satisfy the
eligibility requirements are obtaining SIVS.
2 6
Despite these problems, the written recommendation remains
an essential part of this program and "is central to establishing
petition and SIV entitlement."' 127  The recommendation screening
is critical because once a petition, along with a recommendation, is
approved by the USCIS, it is prima facie evidence of the
122 See id.
123 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163,
§ 1059, 119 Stat. 3136, 3443-44.
124 While the language "faithful and valuable service" was not in the original Act
for FY 2006, later amendments did utilize this language in describing the requirement for
valid petitioners. See 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL 42.32(d)(10), at
N2.1(3) (establishing the criteria that a petitioner filing for special immigrant status
under the § 1059 program "[m]ust have provided faithful and valuable service to the
United States Armed Forces or the COM, which is documented in a favorable written
recommendation from a general or flag officer in the chain of command of the United
States Armed Forces unit that was supported by the alien, or if the applicant claims status
based on work under COM authority, a favorable written recommendation from the
COM.").
125 STATUS REPORT, supra note 103, at 8.
126 See id.
127 Id. at 10.
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petitioner's entitlement to SIV status, unless new facts arise during
the visa interview which were not available to the USCIS officers
during adjudication of the petition.'28 Once an approved petition
reaches the interview stage, consular officers "'look behind'
petitions only when facts unknown to petition adjudicators
surface."'2 9 Thus, any defect in the petitioning process leading up
to USCIS approval carries through the remainder of the process to
the granting of SIV status. 3 ° These vague recommendations from
officers of lesser authority and knowledge about the specific
petitioner are such defects that, once gone undetected, are not
reviewed again, and ultimately determine whether a petitioner is
given or refused a visa.' Petitioners who did indeed work as an
interpreter or translator and have a strong case for SIV status
under the program may have a decreased chance if a scrutinizing
officer discovers the questionably vague written
recommendation.'32 On the other hand, an officer with a less
discriminating eye may overlook a nonspecific written
recommendation and approve a petitioner who did not in fact work
primarily as an interpreter and thus should not move further in the
process to obtain SIV status.' 33 At the same time, eligible
petitioners who do fall within the legislative intent of the program
may be denied an SIV simply because a written recommendation
was poorly written or failed to tailor its content to that particular
petitioner. 34
Beyond the cases of non-interpreters and non-translators and
questionable written recommendations, additional adjudicated
cases seemed to fall outside the scope of the legislative intent of
128 See 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL 42.32(D)(10), at N6 ("The
approval of a petition under INA § 204 is considered to establish prima facie entitlement
to status, and the qualifications of the alien beneficiary are presumed to exist. Unless
[the consular officer has] specific, substantial evidence of either misrepresentation in the
petition process or facts unknown to the [Department of Homeland Security] at the time
of approval, [the consular officer] generally would have no reason to return the petition
to [Department of Homeland Security].").
129 STATUS REPORT, supra note 103, at 10.
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See id.
134 See id.
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the program.'35 Notable concerns are petitioners who applied
under this program but could benefit from another category of
immigrant visa individually or derivatively. For instance, this
would include nationals who have dual nationalities or legally
reside in another country, or even individuals who can apply as
parents or spouses of U.S. citizens or resettled refugees.
136
Additionally, there were cases where spouses and unmarried
children of Iraqi translators/interpreters received separate SIV
visas, though they could have come in as dependants, thereby
freeing the SIV slot for other applicants.'37 Finally, the OIG team
observed that some cases involved SIV interpreter/translator visa
recipients who expressed an intention to establish legal permanent
residence in the United States and then to return to Iraq to their
families and previous jobs.'38 These recipients seem to fall outside
of the class of individuals the program was created to protect,
namely those that need protection and resettlement in the United
States due to their work in Iraq for U.S. forces.'39
While efficient processing of these visas is essential to the
success of these special immigrant programs, it is also important
to ensure that the recipients of these SIVs are indeed those that the
program intended to benefit. The SIV program under Section
1059 must recalibrate to its legislative intent and ensure that only
truly qualified applicants receive the SIV allotments. A more
targeted program requires clearer requirements for written
recommendations and assurance that recommendations are
carefully reviewed during USCIS processing so that potential
defects do not persist through later stages of the process as long as
the prima facie evidence of visa qualification exists.
B. Section 1244 Special Immigration Visa Program for U.S.-
Employed Iraqis
In 2008, Congress created a new SIV program in Section 1244
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.140
135 See id.
136 See STATUS REPORT, supra note 103, at 10.
137 See id.
138 See id. at 11.
139 See id.
140 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
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This second program, while unrelated to the Section 1059 SIV
program for Afghan and Iraqi interpreters, was created to address
some of the issues that the first SlV program was intended to
remedy.' 4 ' The Section 1244 program provides a cushion for the
number of visas issued, while the Section 1059 program is
transitioning back to its cap of fifty allotments.' 42  Applicants
under the Section 1059 interpreter/translator program whose
petitions were approved may convert those petitions to a petition
under the 1244 program without having to satisfy any additional
qualifications, subject to certain exceptions.' 43  This is true for
approved petitioners of Afghan nationality even though the
Section 1244 program was not originally applicable to Afghan
nationals. 1" Specifically, the Section 1244 SIV program, also
referred to as the Kennedy Bill, authorizes 5,000 SIVs to self-
petitioning Iraqi nationals who:
" Worked with or on behalf of the U.S. government for a
period of at least twelve months on or after March 20, 2003;
" Provided faithful and valuable service to the U.S.
government documented by a positive recommendation
from the employee's senior supervisor;
* Clear a background check and screening as determined by
the Secretary of Homeland Security;
* Have experienced or are experiencing an ongoing serious
threat as a result of U.S. government employment;
" Obtain COM approval; and
* Are otherwise eligible to receive an immigrant visa and
admission to the United States for permanent residence,
181, § 1244, 122 Stat. 3, 396-98.
141 See STATUS REPORT, supra note 103, at 1.
142 See OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, STATE LE1TER #08-04, CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2008 (2008).
143 See 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL 42.32(d)(10), at N7 (stating
the conditions in which an approved petition under the § 1059 program can be converted
to an approved petition under the § 1244 program).
144 See 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL 42.32(d)(1 1) (stating that
"Section 602(b) of Division F, Title VI, of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009,
Public Law 111-8, authorizes SQ1 for Afghan nationals who have been employed by or
on behalf of the U.S. Government in Afghanistan on or after October 7, 2001, for a
period of not less than one year" and thus revising the original § 1244 program eligibility
to include nationals of Afghanistan).
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except that the grounds for inadmissibility relating to
"public charge" shall not apply.'45
Though Section 1244 and Section 1059 have similar
requirements, aspects of the Section 1244 program may help to
address the dilemmas of the Section 1059 program. The 1244
program has vastly increased the annual allotment to 5,000 S1Vs
as compared to the original fifty SIVs granted in 2006, and the
temporary 500 SIVs for 2007 and 2008 under the
interpreter/translator program. 14  Part of the reason for such an
expanded allotment is that the program broadens the scope of
qualifying employment activities from interpreting or translating
to working in any capacity "on behalf of the United States
Government in Iraq."'147  This expanded scope would indeed
relieve the caseload of the Section 1059 program.
Some problems associated with the Section 1059 program
remain unresolved by the implementation of Section 1244. For
instance, there is disparate treatment of Afghan nationals and Iraqi
nationals under the new program. When the Section 1244
program was created, it applied only to Iraqi nationals, however,
in new regulations effective since March 2009, Section 1244 now
makes available 1,500 SIVs for nationals of Afghanistan.
148
Despite this, there are still significantly more SIVs available for
Iraqi nationals as compared to Afghan nationals, such that even
with the allotment of SIVs for Afghan nationals under Section
1244, Afghan nationals who worked as translators or in some
other capacity for the United States are still limited to 1,500 SIVs
under the SIV programs combined. 149  As a result, an Afghan
translator petitioning under the Section 1244 program will be in a
much broader pool of Afghan nationals as compared to an Iraqi
petitioning under similar circumstances.
Another limitation to Section 1244 is that eligible petitioners
145 National Defense Authorization Act § 1244. The Chief of Mission is generally
the ambassador at an embassy, and, thus, here would be the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.
See FOREIGN SERV. INST., U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, FOREIGN SERVICE ASSIGNMENT
NOTEBOOK: WHAT Do I Do Now? 203 (2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/21908.pdf.
146 STATUS REPORT, supra note 103, at 3.
147 National Defense Authorization Act § 1244.
148 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL 42.32(d)(1 1), at N2.
149 See STATUS REPORT, supra note 103.
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must prove an "ongoing serious threat" as a result of their work
with the U.S. government. 5 ' According to the Foreign Affairs
Manual, the existence of an "ongoing serious threat" is determined
by the Chief of Mission (COM) and requires that applicants
"submit information to demonstrate that they are experiencing an
ongoing serious threat, which may include statements from their
employer, personal statements, or statements from community
leaders."'' This burdens applicants with an additional level of
proof and in some cases may prevent them from receiving SIV
status. If officers do not have clear standards to determine what
constitutes a "serious threat," when it is "ongoing," or at what time
it becomes "serious," there is too much room for arbitrariness or
non-issuance of the visas. For instance, would verbal abuse
constitute a "serious threat" or would an officer require evidence
of physical harm? What if the verbal abuse occurred unceasingly
over a period of two years while the physical harm occurred over a
period of a week? Is either of these circumstances sufficiently
"ongoing?"
Overall, the Section 1244 program could significantly remedy
the problem of over-inclusiveness that plagued the Section 1059
program. This program, if successfully implemented, would
provide another path for Iraqi petitioners who may have otherwise
attempted to obtain a visa under the more limited Section 1059
program. As petitions begin to come in under this new program, it
could relieve floods of Section 1059 petitioners who are not
qualified, thus focusing the Section 1059 program on those
applicants who need it most, namely Afghan nationals and Iraqi
nationals who, in fact, work as interpreters and translators. In the
early years of this fledgling program, the Department of State
"will need to identify funding requirements, especially to cover the
cost of refugee resettlement benefits to SIV recipients and their
families; develop clear guidance on eligibility for adjudicators,
and maintain a high level of vigilance due to the high risk of fraud
and abuse."'52 Since March 2009, the Department of State has
certainly taken steps towards clarifying the Section 1244 program
by issuing regulations and addressing some of the concerns over
150 National Defense Authorization Act § 1244.
151 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL 42.32(d)(1 1), at N5.
152 STATUS REPORT, supra note 103, at 1.
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potential Afghani national petitioners.153 How these guidelines are
implemented will determine the overall success and effect of the
program.
C. Refugee Benefits under Special Immigration Visa
Programs
Recent legislation has authorized certain benefits from the
Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) for special immigrants
entering under either the Section 1059 or the Section 1244 SIV
program. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 states that
"Iraqi and Afghan aliens granted special immigrant status under
section 101 (a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act shall be
eligible for resettlement assistance, entitlement programs, and
other benefits available to refugees admitted under section 207 of
such Act for a period not to exceed 6 months." '154 Letter #08-04
from the ORR clarified that such benefits are available to Afghan
and Iraqi special immigrants under the Section 1059 program and
would be effective after December 26, 2007, the date the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 was signed. 5 5  The
available benefits are essentially the same as those given to
refugees coming in under the U.S. Refugee Assistance Program.
15 6
When Section 1244 of the National Defense Authorization Act
was enacted on January 28, 2008, it created the Iraqi SIV program,
but also provided that those Iraqi special immigrants would be
entitled to the same resettlement and entitlement programs "for a
period not to exceed eight months.' ' 157 The benefits would be the
same as those given to Afghan and Iraqi special immigrants under
Section 1059, but with an additional two months of entitlement.
153 See 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL 42.32(d)(1 1).
154 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, §525, 121 Stat.
1844, 2212 (2007).
155 See OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, supra note 142 (regarding the subject of
the "Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008: Time Limited Eligibility for ORR Benefits
and Services of Iraqis and Afghans Granted Special Immigration Status under Section
101(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)").
156 See generally Benefits and Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement,
http://www.acf'hhs.gov/programs/orrIbenefits/index.htm (listing cash and medical
assistance, social services, and health as benefits).
157 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181,
§ 1244, 122 Stat. 3, 396-98.
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Letter #08-06 from the ORR noted that it "superseded" previous
ORR Letter #08-04 and that "[t]his State Letter stipulates that all
Iraqi Special Immigrants are eligible for eight months of ORR
benefits and services from date of entry to the U.S.," while "ORR
State Letter #08-04 remains in effect only as to Afghan Special
Immigrants, who remain eligible for six months of benefits.' 58
These recent legislative moves granting resettlement aid are
encouraging steps toward providing former Afghan and Iraqi U.S.
employees with not only a path into the United States, but also the
resources to live there.
V. Ongoing Obstacles with Special Immigration Visa
Programs
Despite great strides in providing a path to the United States
for former Iraqi employees, the SlV programs must overcome a
number of obstacles in order to realize true benefits for the Iraqis
displaced within and outside of Iraq. Most significant is the lack
of visas resulting from the recently imposed cap by Section 1059
and the still fledgling Section 1244 SIV program. In addition,
inefficient visa processing will exacerbate the backlog of even
larger caseloads from the new SIV program. Long pending
periods for visa petitions may be dire for Iraqis who are under
threats of persecution and death. Finally, new Iraqi and U.S.
policies that invalidate certain Iraqi passports are barring Iraqis
from travel to visa interviews and travel between their host and
home country, even with a valid visa. The long queues to apply
for and process new passports only hinder the intended goal of the
SIV programs-the speedy and safe transport of Iraqi interpreters
or translators and their families to the United States.
A. Lack of Visas
On October 1, 2008, the 50-case SIV cap under Section 1059
was reinstated. 159  While Congress could approve another
temporary expansion of the visa allotment, there is no indication
that such legislation is on the horizon. In the meantime, Section
1059 petitions subject to the cap are increasing with even smaller
158 OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, supra note 142.
159 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL 42.32(d)(10), at N3(c) (discussing
October 1, 2008 as the deadline for petitions to be converted under Section 1244).
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chances of receiving a SW. Even though these Section 1059
petitions can be converted into Section 1244 petitions, applicants
still must wait for processing in the new program, and "because of
the expected processing time involved, it is doubtful that
embassies will meet the 5,000 case potential in Fiscal Year
2008.''16° Indeed, in fiscal year 2008, only 705 visas were
issued.16' However, by March 2009, not only had processing
begun, but 641 visas had been issued to Iraqis since fiscal year
2008 under the Section 1244 program. 16 2 Additionally, a more
recent status update from January 2010 reported that the number
of issued visas had increased to 3,028 as of September 2009.163
Though the increased movement under Section 1244 is
encouraging, processing times vary and there are still many
applications waiting to make their way through the system."
Also, while Section 1244 may provide additional visas for
Iraqi and Afghan nationals who worked for the United States,
Afghan nationals must resort to the fifty Section 1059 visas
available only to those who worked as "interpreters or
translators" 161 or petition for one of the 1,500 visas under the
Section 1244 program that are available for any Afghan national
who worked for the United States in other capacities.
B. Inefficiency of Visa Processing
An article in The Guardian best described the never-ending
queues facing Iraqis once they begin the petitioning process as "a
succession of queues. They queue outside western embassies for
visas, asylum, reunion, waving letters from relatives and
university certificates. They queue outside the JNHCR for a
160 STATUS REPORT, supra note 103, at 1.
161 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF NEAR E. AFFAIRS, IRAQ STATUS REPORT 12
(2009).
162 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF NEAR E. AFFAIRS, IRAQ STATUS REPORT 9
(2009).
163 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF NEAR E. AFFAIRS, IRAQ STATUS REPORT 7
(2010).
164 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, PROMISES TO THE PERSECUTED: THE REFUGEE CRISIS
IN IRAQ ACT OF 2008, at 12 (2009) (providing a chart showing the SIV application
process and average wait times).
165 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163,
§ 1059, 119 Stat. 3136, 3443-44.
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document identifying them as refugees and granting them
protection from deportations. They queue for everything."' 66
Slow processing time is especially concerning when applicants
have demonstrated the Section 1244 requirement that they are in
danger or are under "ongoing serious threat[s]" in the countries
where they are anxiously awaiting approval. The main cause of
inefficiency is a lack of proper resource planning. The increased
caseload resulting from the new Section 1244 program requires
more workspace in the consular offices, as well as additional
staff.167 However, the funds needed to finance these expansions
are not offset by any increase in user fees. Doing so would require
Iraqi SIV applicants to pay processing fees, which are typically
waived for all categories of special immigrants under current
immigration policy. 1
68
C. Invalidation of Iraqi Passports
Recent changes in Iraqi passports also raise very serious
concerns for valid travel to and from the country where a visa
interview is scheduled, as well as entry into the United States once
a petition has been approved. Since the breakout of war in 2003,
the Iraqi government has gradually ceased issuance and
invalidated many of its previous series of passports. 169 First, due
to reports of counterfeiting, the Iraqi government stopped issuing
its H-series passports, the passports issued while Saddam Hussein
was in power. 70 Fearing similar security breaches with other
166 Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, Despairing and Disregarded The Daily Quest to Get Out
of Baghdad, GUARDIAN, Mar. 21, 2007, 14, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/mar/2 1/iraq-middleeast.
167 See STATUS REPORT, supra note 103, at 13-14.
168 See id.
169 See Zoi Constantine, UAE Iraqis Restricted by Passport Delays, NATIONAL (Abu
Dhabi), Aug. 28, 2008, available at http://www.thenational.ae/article/20080828
/NATIONAL/858811262/1 010/rss.
170 See id.; see also RESEARCH DIRECTORATE, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD. OF
CAN., No. IRQ 10201 .E IRAQ: PROCEDURES IN PLACE SINCE MARCH 2003 TO OBTAIN AND
TO RENEW A PASSPORT FROM WITHIN THE COUNTRY; VALIDITY AND STATUS OF PRE-2003
PASSPORTS (2006) (describing the various series of Iraqi passports and that the M-, N-,
and H-series passports were all issued while Saddam Hussein was in power but in
different years. M-series passports were first issued in 1988; N-series passports were
issued from 1997 until 2002; and the H-series passports were issued from 2002 until
March 2003).
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passport series, the M- and N- series passports were also
invalidated.17' Even S-series passports, which were issued after
the removal of Sadam Hussein, were no longer recognized after
January 2007.172 After these changes, only the newest series of G-
passports are valid for travel.'73  The new G-series biometric
passport is electronically readable and, thus, is purported to be a
more secure option for countries accepting foreign travelers.
174
Despite invalidation of most former passports, the information
regarding the new G-series passports did not reach the consular
posts abroad and thus, did not significantly change procedures
within Iraq.' However, on January 8, 2007, the United States
announced that it would recognize only Iraqi G-series passports
and that the invalidation of all other passports would be effective
immediately. 176  The announcement gave little time for the Iraq
government to acquire the machines and training needed to issue
new G-series passports for Iraqi citizens. 1
77
At first, only the office in Baghdad could print and issue the
new passports. 17 8  This posed significant problems for Iraqi
nationals who had fled Iraq and were now living in neighboring
countries, as they were stranded in the new country without a valid
travel document. 179  The ordeal was best reflected in an article
reporting on growing problems in obtaining passports:
As the violence has increased so has the desperation
behind the thick blast walls that ring the passport office
yard. Each day the officials consider applications from a
single Baghdad district; each day they issue just 100 forms.
Anyone failing to get one has to wait a month until the
171 See Constantine, supra note 169.
172 See id.
173 See id.
174 See id.
175 See Ahmed Janabi, Passport Confusion Hits Iraq Expats, AUAZEERA.NET, Mar.
20, 2007, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2007/03/2008525173159
185726.html.
176 Farah Stockman, Passport Rule Change in U.S. Keeps Iraqis Out, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 7, 2007, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/
02/07/passport rule change in us keepsiraqis out/.
177 See id.
178 See Id.
179 See id.
2010]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
neighbourhood comes up again. For those who do get a
form, it is the start of a surreal obstacle course. 80
As recently as February 2007, Iraqi citizens were told the only
way to get the passport was to travel to Baghdad."' Samir
Sumaida'ie, Iraq's ambassador to the United States, remarked that
it was "unfair to demand that people go to Baghdad... [t]here is
the expense, the risk, the security situation. It is difficult for
people, so they are left with very hard choices.... Many people
who want to travel are inconvenienced, or indeed stranded."' 8 2 As
a result of these new policies, Iraqis who were traveling on valid
visas were turned away at ports of entry because the visas were
now invalid passports.183 Iraqis who had already been issued SIVs
to the United States were unable to enter the country on their
invalid passports and were forced to return to Iraq.184 Iraqis living
in Iraq cannot travel to Amman, Jordan for visa interviews as
neighboring countries are enforcing stricter rules for Iraqis
traveling into their borders.'85 Even if Iraqis are able to apply for a
new G-series passport, the process is slow due to lack of printing
machines and unfamiliarity with the new technology necessary to
create these G-series passports. 186 The application process for the
new passport presents further problems as applicants are required
to produce certain official documents, some of which are now
incomplete, destroyed, or inaccessible due to the looting of
government buildings in the aftermath of the war."7 The result is
that Iraqis who have endured long processing times for their SIV
now must wait even longer, often under threat of danger.
There has been some flexibility regarding the passport
confusion. Originally, the Jordanian embassy set a June 1, 2007
deadline for valid entry by Iraqi nationals holding S-series
passports.'88 However, after requests by the Iraqi government to
180 Abdul-Ahad, supra note 166, 5-6.
181 See Stockman, supra note 176.
182 Id. 6.
183 See id. at 1.
184 See id.
185 See id.
186 See id.
187 See Constantine, supra note 169.
188 See Linda Hindi, Iraqis Granted Extra 7 Months to Upgrade Passports, JORDAN
TiMEs, May 30, 2007, http://www.jordanembassyus.org/05302007003.htm.
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allow more time to transition to the G-series passport, the
Jordanian embassy granted a seven-month extension to Iraqis
traveling into Jordan.'89 This extension until the end of 2007 was
extremely important for Iraqis who had visa interviews scheduled
in Amman. Even an extension of just seven months could expedite
the visa approval process for not only S-series passport holders,
but also free up the queues of other passport holders needing G-
series passports. 9° Even for those not benefitting from Jordan's
seven-month extension, there is hope that Iraqi citizens will soon
receive valid passports.191 The Iraqi government is in the process
of establishing new sites with capable of issuing the passports.
192
A greater quantity of sites in Iraq is as crucial as increasing the
number of sites in surrounding countries such as Jordan and Syria
where many Iraqi citizens live.'93
Section 1244 attempts to address the issues regarding these
new passport policies. The Foreign Assistance Manual states:
Section 1244(d) .. .provide[s] that the Secretary of State
must make a reasonable effort to ensure that aliens who are
issued special immigrant visas under section 1244 are
provided with the appropriate series Iraqi ...passport
necessary to enter the United States. Posts are reminded of
the waiver provisions of 22 CFR § 42.2(g).'94
22 C.F.R. § 42.2 (g) authorizes the Secretary of State, upon
instruction from the Department of State, to waive the passport
requirement for a foreign national who would belong in a category
of immigrants that is not required to present a passport in applying
for an immigrant visa "except that the alien is applying for a visa
in a country of which the applicant is a national and possession of
a passport is required for departure."' 95
189 See id.
190 See id.
191 See id.
192 See id.
193 See, e.g., Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Iraq: Official Says Refugees to Get
New Passports Soon, http://www.rferI.org/content/article/1075131.html (last visited Apr.
1, 2010) (stating that both embassies and the Iraqi government need to develop
additional capacities).
194 9 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL 42.32(d)(1 1), at NI 1.
195 22 C.F.R. § 42.2(g) (2009).
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The Iraqi passport confusion still presents an obstacle to
successful resettlement of Iraqi refugees. As early as August
2008, Iraqis living in the United Arab Emirates were still enduring
long waits for the new passports.196 While the consulate stated that
it takes forty-five days to issue G-series passport, some Iraqis
waited months before seeing the document.197
VI. Recommendations for Action
In light of these obstacles, the U.S. government should take
steps to facilitate the safe and successful immigration of Iraqi
interpreters and translators who wish to resettle in the United
States. In order to ensure that the Section 1059 and Section 1244
programs fulfill their legislative goals in truly benefiting the Iraqi
nationals who are the most at risk, the U.S. government will need
to engage the Iraqi government as well as the international
community. Starting from changes in the existing U.S. policies,
Congress should more clearly define crucial terms in the
legislation enacting both Iraqi SIV programs as well as set out
specific guidelines for implementation of the more recent Section
1244 program. Additionally, Congress should carefully review the
new policies regarding resettlement benefits for Iraqi SIV
beneficiaries, making sure that they are realistic and feasible. The
Department of State should make practical estimates of the cost
and staff resources needed for delivering resettlement benefits.
The Iraqi government must also play a role in expediting the
issuing of G-series passports by setting up more processing centers
within Iraq and in the surrounding countries. The U.S.
government should coordinate its visa processing with Iraqi
passport processing to facilitate a smoother overall process for
Iraqis petitioning under the U.S. SIV programs. Finally, the
United States, along with the rest of the international community,
should continue offering aid to countries like Syria and Jordan,
which are still struggling to support an influx of displaced Iraqis.
A. Clarify Definitions in Special Immigation Visa Statutory
Provisions
Congress should clarify definitions in the legislation enacting
196 See Constantine, supra note 169.
197 See id.
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both SIV special immigration programs for Afghan interpreters
and translators and Iraqis in order to ensure that the beneficiaries
of such programs fall within the legislative intent of each program.
For the Section 1059 program, Congress must address who
qualifies as an "interpreter/translator."' 98  For the Section 1244
program, Congress must specify what is necessary to prove an
"ongoing serious threat" as well as what constitutes "faithful and
valuable service. 199 As the Section 1059 program continues with
the decreased cap of fifty, it becomes even more essential that the
beneficiaries of each SIV fulfill the requirements of the program.
Strict screening of applications with very clear guidelines of what
to look for in an applicant is necessary for proper implementation
of the interpreter/translator program in the upcoming years where
SIVs are more limited and, thus, more coveted. Officials
screening applicants must also consider that even with the
implementation of the Section 1244 program, the 1059 program
may be the primary path to immigration for Afghan interpreters
and translators. 20  Thus, officials screening applications for the
Section 1059 program should prioritize Afghan nationals over
those Iraqi nationals who may qualify for the Section 1244
program.
In processing the applicants to these SIV programs, the United
States should properly distinguish national security concerns and
inadequacy of the process concerns. While security is of utmost
concern in processing immigration applications, "for thousands of
Iraqi refugees that raise no security concerns, the problem is not
with the security requirements themselves, but rather, the lack of
personnel and resources allocated for processing the refugees. 20°
B. Assess Resettlement Benefit Policies
Congress should conduct careful reviews of policies regarding
resettlement benefits under the SIV programs. The policies must
198 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163,
§ 1059, 119 Stat. 3136, 3443-44.
199 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181,
§ 1244, 112 Stat. 3, 396-98.
200 See STATUS REPORT, supra note 103, at 8 n. 7.
201 Kevin Walsh, Victims of a Growing Crisis: A Call for Reform of the United
States Immigration Law and Policy Pertaining to Refugees of the Iraq War, 53 VILL. L
REV. 421,454 (2008).
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ensure proper and adequate delivery of the benefits once the
immigrants arrive in the United States, keeping in mind the
challenges of such benefits delivery in other countries. To begin,
such an ambitious undertaking calls for increased staffing and
resources, which requires more funds." 2 More importantly, the
Department of State must remain realistic about the costs of
providing refugee resettlement benefits to SIV recipients and their
families. The funds to provide these benefits will come out of the
current refugee account of the Bureau of Population, Refugees,
and Migration (PRM), and will certainly have no small effect on
its holdings.03 While it is too early to measure the full monetary
impact of offering resettlement benefits to Iraqi SIV recipients, it
has been estimated that "the annual cost of refugee benefits
payable to holders of SIVs from PRM monies [is] up to $48
million."20 4  This estimate assumes a modest caseload of two
individuals per case.20 5 Increasing the total caseload by just one
individual per case to a total of three individuals per case (which
some believe is a more realistic estimate) would increase the
annual resettlement cost to nearly $75 million.2"6
It is crucial that the Department of State and other relevant
governmental agencies anticipate these costs especially as they are
promising the benefits to Iraqis coming through the SIV programs.
The U.S. government should prevent any misrepresentation of
resettlement benefits to Iraqis prior to arrival, a problem that befell
the Iraqi interpreter resettlement programs in Britain, Australia
and Denmark.20 7 Learning from those mistakes, the United States
should make it a priority to follow through with their resettlement
promises and policy objectives.
Once the United States has committed to resettling its former
Iraqi employees, it should commit not only to physically transport
the individuals or families, but also to facilitate the transition once
the individuals are within the borders. Doing so will prevent the
202 See STATUS REPORT, supra note 103, at 14.
203 Id.
204 Id. This estimate was given by a senior coordinator on Iraqi refugee issues
during a March 2008 congressional hearing on Iraqi refugees and SIVs. Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 See supra Part III.A-C.
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unfortunate situation where Iraqis, once resettled in the United
States, are unable to maintain a standard of living and ultimately
risk danger and continued persecution by returning to Iraq.2 °8
Rather than adopting the British policies which force formerly
employed Iraqi nationals to choose between resettlement or a
financial package,2 °9 the United States should properly respect
those Iraqi nationals who served its armed forces by honoring the
commitment to bring them and their families into the country and
provide basic benefits necessary to maintain a comfortable
existence.
C. Expedite the Issuing of Iraqi G-Series Passports
The Iraqi government should create more efficient ways to
issue the new G-series Iraqi passports so that those who are in the
petitioning process are not put at risk while waiting for valid travel
documents. Specifically, the Iraqi government should establish
more centers with passport-issuing capabilities in order to relieve
the backlogged applications in the Baghdad office. Typically, an
Iraqi national applying for a G-series passport outside of Iraq
would complete an application distributed from the Baghdad
consulate.21° The application would then be sent to the ministry of
foreign affairs in Baghdad for processing before moving on to the
ministry of interior, which is responsible for issuing the
passports."' Removing the need to send applications back and
forth from the host country to Baghdad will significantly expedite
the approval process and issuing of the new passports.212 Of
course, countries with higher percentages of displaced Iraqi
refugees such as Syria and Jordan should have greatest priority.
Other neighboring countries, however, would also benefit from
having passport-processing centers within their borders.
Ultimately, these additional passport-processing centers will
expedite the issuance of additional G-series passports, freeing up
the queues in the Baghdad embassy. Additionally, if Iraqi
208 See supra Part III.A-C (describing how Iraqi immigrants were unable to find
adequate housing or jobs upon arrival and thus chose to return to Iraq).
209 See supra Part IM.A.
210 See Constantine, supra note 169.
211 See id.
212 See id.
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applicants need to resolve issues regarding the processing of their
passports, they no longer have to risk their safety by travelling into
Baghdad.
D. Continue Providing Bilateral Assistance to Major Host
Countries
The United States should continue offering bilateral assistance
at least to the major host countries of Jordan, Syria, and Egypt, as
well as to other host countries with fewer Iraqi refugees, so that
the Iraqi refugee communities in those countries have access to
basic necessities and resources.2"3 The host countries shouldering
the greatest populations of displaced Iraqi refugees, whether they
have served as interpreters and translators, do not have sufficient
economic or social resources to accommodate such an influx of
persons. "Burden sharing and mutual accountability should exist
among the international community to cope with the growing
number of refugees. 21 4 Thus the changes in immigration policy
as proposed here must go hand in hand with continued assistance
to those countries that continue to strain under the burden of
providing education, health, and housing opportunities to
displaced Iraqis.
VII.Conclusion
Though the recently enacted Section 1244 SIV program faces
problems of policy specificity, efficiency, and resource allotment
that also plagued similar programs in other countries and even the
previously-enacted U.S. Section 1059 SIV program, it has great
potential to effectively protect Iraqi nationals who faithfully
served the U.S. military forces in Iraq.
When the Section 1244 program acts in concert with Section
1059 program, those Iraqis who formerly worked as interpreters
and translators with the United States will realize the true benefit
and protection of permanent resettlement in the United States.
To meet these program goals, the United States must first
ensure that the statutory language defining the SIV programs is
clear and precise, that the necessary resources and funds for
providing benefits are available and accounted for, that there is
213 See INT'L RESCUE COMM., supra note 2, at 12.
214 Walsh, supra note 201, at 421.
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proper engagement with the Iraqi government to ease G-series
passport processing, and that the international community is
cooperating and assisting in the relief of the Iraqi refugee crisis.
The successful implementation of these SIV programs depends on
these urgent policy changes and recommendations.
By enacting the Section 1059 and Section 1244 Iraqi SIV
programs, the U.S. government recognizes at least a responsibility
to protect those Iraqi nationals who faithfully served U.S. soldiers
and U.S. land. Indeed the risk to these Iraqi interpreters' and their
families' lives, even after their employment has ended, deserves a
significant expression of gratitude. However, the Iraqi refugee
crisis extends far beyond this group of Iraqis. While formerly
employed Iraqi interpreters and translators suffer, especially due to
the nature of their employment, millions of Iraqis still live
displaced and fearful lives simply due to their existence as Iraqis.
With such a humanitarian crisis at hand, it is the hope that these
Iraqi SIV programs become not just the endpoint of U.S.
immigration policy goals, but the beginning of more ambitious and
globally-impacting immigration policy goals.
I asked him if he felt betrayed by America. "I have this
nature-I don't expect a lot from people," Firas said. "Not
betrayed, no, not disappointed. I can never blame the
Americans alone. It's the Iraqis who destroyed their
country, with the help of the Americans, under the
American eye." I was about to say that he deserved better,
but Firas was lost in thought. "To this moment," he said, "I
dream about America., 2
1 5
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215 Packer, supra note 1, at 73.
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